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Abstract 
This paper examines the advocacy tactics of Russian nonprofits. While Russian 
nonprofits and their activities have been widely researched, specific insight into their use of 
advocacy tactics remains limited. In this paper we address this gap by broadening the 
understanding of how Russian nonprofits engage in advocacy. To do so we engage both 
Mosley’s (2012) indirect/insider framework and qualitative data collected from health and 
education nonprofits (HEnonprofits) in three Russian industrial regions. We demonstrate that 
Russian HEnonprofits, while having access to various advocacy tactics, fail to employ them 
effectively. They are instead used for organizational maintenance and case/client advocacy. In 
conclusion, we discuss a potential typology of advocacy tactics in Russia, the usefulness of 
Mosley’s framework in this context and the implications of the failure to advocate for 
democratization within the Russian Federation.  
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Following the transition process after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian 
Federation has retained a mix of democratic participation and authoritarian rule (Wegren & 
Konitzer, 2007). This means that Russia’s brand of democratic governance or managed 
democracy (Wegren & Konitzer, 2007), limits the scope of nonprofit activity and thus impact 
the ability of organizations to engage in activities aimed at influencing public policy – 
generally referred to as advocacy. To shed light on this issue, we illustrate the nature, type, 
and use of advocacy tactics by Russian nonprofits in the health and education sector; a sector 
hitherto relatively neglected in the study of Russian civil society (Ljubownikow & Crotty, 
2014).  
The focus on health and education nonprofits (hereon in: HEnonprofits) offers specific 
insight into an area which has seen government failure (Weisbrod, 1978) – the retreat of the 
Russian state from its social responsibilities (Sil & Chen, 2004) – with the burden falling on 
HEnonprofits to plug the gap (Rivkin-Fish, 1999). The health sector in particular has seen 
increased demand for services related to drug and alcohol abuse, mental health, and 
HIV/AIDS: areas in which Russian practices are said to be lagging behind global best practice 
(Titterton, 2006). Further, Iarskaia-Smirnova and Romanov (2002) conclude that resource 
allocation and social service-provision by the Russian state suffers from inertia. Given the 
lack of democratic accountability within a system of managed democracy (Wegren & 
Konitzer, 2007) it is advocacy by HEnonprofits which could provide important impetus for 
necessary changes in this area of public policy. Therefore, we ask how Russian HEnonprofits 
advocate in this context. In so doing we address Almog-Bar and Schmid’s (2014) recent call 
for a more nuanced understanding of advocacy in different contexts. To do so we structure the 
paper as follows. We first outline the literature on nonprofit advocacy, followed by an 
overview of factors affecting advocacy activities of Russian nonprofits. We then describe the 
research study from which the findings in the paper derive and present its findings. To 
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conclude, we illustrate the limitations of the study and outline the contributions the paper 
makes. 
Nonprofit Advocacy Activities 
We understand advocacy as the “expressive function” (James & Rose-Ackerman, 
1986, p. 9) or the voice of nonprofits. By this we mean their ability to gain access to the 
relevant institutions or individuals and the capability to influence them (Almog-Bar & 
Schmid, 2014). Hence advocacy can be seen as “the term generally used to describe efforts to 
influence public policy” (Boris & Mosher-Williams, 1998, p. 488) and thus to effect changes 
in the nonprofits’ operating environment (Frumkin, 2002; Moulton & Eckerd, 2012; Suarez & 
Hwang, 2008). Similar to other contexts, public policy in the Russian Federation is 
understood as the principles, policies, and practices implement by state power (Wheeler, 
Unbegaun, Falla, & Thompson, 2000). Advocacy therefore turns nonprofits into active 
governance actors (Chaskin & Greenberg, 2013); non-elected representatives for their 
constituency or the public (Mosley & Grogan, 2013). Consequently, the objectives of 
nonprofit advocacy activities are wide ranging and can include agenda setting, influencing 
long-term priorities and/or resource allocation (Andrews & Edwards, 2004). In addition, 
Mosley (2012) observes that nonprofits engage in advocacy activities when policy restricts 
their ability to deliver services, use advocacy to build partnerships with the state and its 
agents, to secure funding, and/or share/promote their expertise. A vital part of nonprofit 
advocacy activities also relates to lobbying, the attempt to directly influence legislation or 
legislative developments (Suarez & Hwang, 2008). Both advocacy as well as its subset of 
lobbying activities are shaped by the regulatory context faced by nonprofits (Kerlin & Reid, 
2010). 
In this paper we focus on service-providing nonprofits for whom advocacy is often a 
secondary activity (Van Til, 2009). These organizations, due to the nature of their funding 
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arrangements, are often in a good position to access policy makers (Mosley, 2010; Moulton & 
Eckerd, 2012). For many such nonprofits advocacy is a crucial support activity (Van Til, 
2009). Even though service-providing nonprofits will have fewer organizational capabilities 
than their advocacy specialist counterparts (Andrews & Edwards, 2004), their engagement in 
advocacy is often crucial to achieve both their long-term objectives (Suarez & Hwang, 2008) 
and to create spaces for social engagement.  
Service-providing nonprofits chose to engage in advocacy for either social benefit, e.g. 
often associated with lobbying in the public interest,  or organizational benefits, e.g. advocacy 
for organizational maintenance and/or survival (Duer & Mateo, 2013; Garrow & Hasenfeld, 
2014; Mosley, 2012; Suarez & Hwang, 2008). Nicholson-Crotty (2009) finds that advocacy  
can often lead to costly retribution against nonprofits by hostile ruling and governing elites, 
including the withholding of resources. In turn this means that service-providing nonprofits 
have to carefully balance their social justice and public interest goals with their service-
providing activities (Sanders & McClellan, 2014; Tomlinson & Schwabenland, 2009). We 
now turn to look in more detail at potential advocacy tactics used by service-providing 
nonprofits.  
Nonprofit Advocacy Tactics	
Mosley (2011) states that nonprofits can engage in advocacy that is indirect and/or 
insider focused. Indirect tactics are used when nonprofits advocate without directly 
participating in the policy making process. Hence, indirect tactics are targeted at engaging the 
public and influencing the public discourse. Indirect advocacy activities may include “writing 
letters to the editor, working with advocacy coalitions, issuing policy reports, and conducting 
a demonstration” (Mosley 2011, p.441) or utilizing social media outlets (Guo & Saxton, 
2014). The mobilization of the public is key to indirect tactics and thus such tactics are more 
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conducive to advocate for issues which have a wider social benefit (i.e. benefit the broader 
public (Garrow & Hasenfeld, 2014)). 
Conversely, where nonprofits use their personal connection to influence public policy, 
Mosley (2011) describes this as insider advocacy or tactics. Insider tactics rely on the 
nonprofit’s capability to directly interact with ruling and governing elites. This interaction can 
take place in a formal, institutionalized setting such as public hearings or committees or 
informally through personal meetings (Mosley, 2011). To operationalize insider tactics 
nonprofits not only require direct access to state institutions but also to individuals embedded 
within ruling and governing elites. These sort of advocacy activities are more conducive to 
ensuring organizational maintenance (Duer & Mateo, 2013; Mosley, 2012). 
In a democratic context, nonprofits seek a balanced combination of both indirect and 
insider tactics to advance their advocacy objectives. In this way they are able to engage with 
multiple governance levels (Beyers & Kerremans 2012) and raise both public awareness 
(indirect tactics) and increase direct participation (insider tactics) (Mosley, 2012). Lobbying 
activities, for example, require this sort of balance of tactics (Suarez & Hwang, 2008). 
Further, in strengthening their advocacy work nonprofits often use political ties (Beyers & 
Kerremans, 2012), establish advocacy networks (Galaskiewicz, Bielefeld, & Dowell, 2006) 
join specialized umbrella organizations (Balassiano & Chandler, 2010; Kraemer, Whiteman, 
& Banerjee, 2013), or bolster membership (Schmid, Bar, & Nirel, 2008). 
However, these insights into nonprofit advocacy behavior assume that such 
organizations operate in an environment within which a political culture of public 
participation and pluralism exists. This is not the case in the context of the Russian Federation 
(Titterton, 2006). Yet, understanding nonprofit advocacy in such a context is important for a 
number of reasons. First, nonprofit advocacy reflects their capability to influence public 
policy and monitor government behavior (Andrews & Edwards, 2004). Second, advocacy 
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reflects the institutionalization of public participation in the political process (Meyer, 2004). 
Third, advocacy ensures nonprofit survival by facilitating access to resources (Mosley, 2012). 
Nevertheless, little is known about the availability, motivation and use of advocacy tactics in 
managed democracies and thus warrants further attention. . 
The Russian context therefore provides an interesting venue within which to explore 
advocacy tactics. To provide some context we shortly summarize the literature of Russian 
civil society development. In so doing we draw on Salamon and Anheier’s (1998) suggestion 
of considering a variety of contextual influences that shape the social space available for 
nonprofit activity and action.  
A Constricted Social Space: The Advocacy Potential of Russian Nonprofits 
The space in which Russian nonprofits operate is still informed by its Soviet 
antecedents. During the Soviet Union there was no independent ‘third sector’ as open dissent 
and public protest was prohibited. Instead Russian society split into two halves, ordinary 
citizens in one, using ties of friendship and family to hedge against the vagaries of central 
planning, whilst elites – factory controllers, senior apparatchiks and party members used 
similar ties to gain favors, obviate rules and consolidate their position and occupied the other 
half (Mishler & Rose, 1997; Rose, 2000). Thus strong ties existed within these groups but 
there was no third sector to bridge the space between the two. This fostered mistrust 
particularly from citizens towards elites. The result was a constriction of Soviet social space.  
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union this constricted spaced remained intact. 
Elites operationalized their ties to secure control of the newly privatized sector, whilst 
ordinary citizens used their ties to hedge against the uncertainties of shock therapy, 
privatization and mass state withdrawal from social services (Mishler & Rose, 1997; Rose, 
2000). At the same time organizations like the ones making up the environmental movement 
which had been so instrumental in taking advantage of the political opportunity of perestroika 
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for mass protest (Tarrow, 1988; Weiner, 2002), splintered into a myriad of small and single 
issue organizations competing for resources (Crotty, 2006), no longer capable of engaging the 
public in this way.  
In addition, factors emerging from within the new Russian state further impeded 
nonprofit development. First the public rejected volunteering in formalized settings as a 
reaction to forced participation in public life during the Soviet period which meant that 
nonprofits have difficulties in recruiting volunteers (Howard, 2002); second as a result of 
Russia’s constricted social space legacy nonprofits are parochial and inward looking resulting 
in a lack of public participation and support for organizations (Crotty, 2006; Spencer, 2011). 
Third nonprofits were unsuccessful in developing domestic funding channels relying on 
foreign support directed at activities without public support (Henderson, 2002). Finally, the 
persistent importance of informal relationships in the Russian Federation (Ledeneva, 2006). 
As stated above, the nature of central planning necessitated the forming of strong informal 
relationships, either to access resources or to retain your elite position. Informal relations thus 
constituted a vital aspect of everyday life in the Soviet Union (Mishler & Rose, 1997) and 
remain an integral part of political and business life in the Russian Federation (Ledeneva, 
2006). However, nonprofits are often characterized as being outside these networks with 
organizations missing informal relations and their associated links (Ljubownikow, Crotty, & 
Rodgers, 2013), as well as opposition and hostility towards nonprofits has impeded the 
development of insider advocacy. In addition, legislative changes since 2006 have limited 
political opportunity (Ljubownikow & Crotty, 2014; Tarrow, 1988) to engage or bridge the 
gap between the public and the Russian elite. 
The Putin/Medvedev administrations have implemented stricter regulation affecting 
nonprofits, which include rules on the use of funding (Maxwell, 2006), classifying nonprofits 
assessed as politically active (for example those engaging in advocacy activities) and 
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receiving foreign funding as foreign agents (Bennetts, 2012). In addition, large fines for 
unofficial demonstrations have also been introduced (Bryanski, 2012). Alongside these 
developments, the Russian state has also promoted regional Civic Chambers 
(Obshchestvennaya palata)	as the main channel for nonprofit-state interaction (Civic 
Chamber of the Russian Federation, 2010).  
Civic Chambers are government initiated structures meant to encourage scrutiny of 
public policy making and public administration (Richter, 2009). They are also responsible for 
the allocation of government funding to nonprofits. Further, the Civic Chambers also organize 
regular roundtables and committees for invited nonprofits to raise and discuss their issues 
(Richter, 2009). However, the invited nature of the Civic Chamber (most members are 
appointed by ruling and governing elites (Richter, 2009)) and its monopoly on access to state 
authorities have a potential restricting effect on the advocacy activities of nonprofits. Thus 
legislative, cultural-historic and organizational factors shape a constricted social space for 
nonprofit advocacy activity. Tarrow (1988) asserts that for political opportunity to occur, 
nonprofits or social movements need one or a combination of shifting alignments, or division 
within elite groupings and influential allies, particularly in non-democratic settings, that can 
protect them from elite response. Within Russia’s constricted social space, even if political 
opportunities arose nonprofits appear to be both without allies and the state has already 
signaled the nature of its response to nonprofits seeking to take advantage of any such 
opportunity – ultimately limiting political opportunities therein. 
Despite these negative indicators, there are some recent examples where nonprofits 
have engaged in effective advocacy. This includes criticism of regulatory changes impacting 
nonprofits (Alekseeva et al., 2005) leading to legislative amendments. Javeline and 
Lindemann-Komarova (2010) also highlight a positive advocacy experience of nonprofits 
coming together at a regional level forcing the re-routing of a planned oil pipeline around 
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Lake Baikal. Nonprofits have also been successful in case advocacy and supported 
individuals in bringing litigation charges against businesses and local councils through the 
Russian court system (Fröhlich, 2012). However, these examples contrast strongly with the 
wider literature on Russian nonprofits which overwhelmingly indicates that such 
organizations have limited advocacy potential (Crotty & Hall, 2013).  
Thus drawing on the wider and general literature on Russian nonprofits we would 
expect that Russian nonprofits are likely to have underdeveloped or constrained advocacy 
opportunities.  To explore this, we focus on Russian nonprofit engagement in activities of an 
advocatory nature (including lobbying) and how nonprofits understand and utilize these 
activities. Before presenting our findings we first provide an overview of our research study. 
The Research Study 
To date, most of the understanding of nonprofits in the Russian context has been 
informed by the study of such organizations in Moscow and St. Petersburg (Javeline & 
Lindemann-Komarova, 2010). With the experience of organizations in provincial Russia 
differing, we base our study in the Russian cities of Perm, Yekaterinburg, and Samara. These 
three cities are representative of Russian cities located in industrialized-provinces, which have 
a significant defense sector and are over 80% ethnic Russian (Federal State Statistics Service, 
2010). We choose these three urban areas as study sites for HEnonprofit advocacy, because 
they are the location of the respective regional authorities and in provincial Russia it is urban 
areas where Russia’s middle class resides and which is traditional associated with more 
nonprofit activity (Salamon & Anheier, 1998). Thus these cities provide the study with a 
relevant as well as sufficiently similar context to examine HEnonprofit advocacy and 
minimizing potential regional factors to act as explanatory influences (Miles & Huberman, 
1999) enhancing transferability of our insights (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  
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HEnonprofits were purposefully selected (Siggelkow, 2007) based on their activities 
and objectives to fit with the study’s focus on health and education. Further we also drew on 
organizations’ own categorization as to whether they defined themselves as nonprofits in the 
Russian Federation often known as obshchestvennyi organizatsii, which translates into social 
or public organizations. Data was collected via a semi-structured interview protocol. This 
protocol was informed by the advocacy literature and literature on Russian civil society 
development (a selection of the questions asked were what projects/activities organization do, 
what factors impact their work, whether they engage in advocacy, what they consider 
advocacy to be, and which of their activities they associated with advocacy) and allowing 
respondents to provide a narrative of their organizations modus operandi (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985). Such an approach enables us to capture the respondent’s own interpretations 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) assisting us in evaluating how respondents understand and characterize the 
activities of their organization.  
Reflecting Spencer’s observation (2011, p. 1080) of Russian nonprofits, most 
HEnonprofits in this study were also dominated by ‘democratic centralism’, where the 
leader’s ideas are automatically adopted by full member consent. Thus, the leader’s response 
represents the most relevant opinion to organizational decision-making. Therefore, interviews 
were conducted in Russian with leaders of nonprofits lasting on average 45 minutes. To 
reduce the risk of self-reporting bias in the interview, this data was triangulated during the 
coding and analysis process with observational and artefactual data (such as flyers, pamphlets, 
published material, and other publically available information) collected by attending 
HEnonprofit events. Appendix A provides an overview of the organizations in this study, 
their activities, and a proxy measure for size.  
To protect the confidentiality of respondents, their responses and organizations were 
anonymized using acronyms. For analysis all interviews were transcribed and translated into 
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English in situ, calling on the skills of native speakers wherever discrepancies arose. 
Documents and artefactual data, if the latter contained textual content, were also translated 
into English. Akin to open coding, inductive coding started with reading and rereading 
interview transcripts, documents, and other textual data (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). This 
process led to the emergence of codes, which were then grouped, into emerging themes. This 
thematic coding (Braun & Clarke, 2006) led to themes centered on the activities of nonprofits, 
whether respondents defined these as entailing advocacy, and how organizations understood 
and organized any advocacy activities they saw themselves engaging in. Themes were then 
assessed for common patterns and/or differences and Mosley’s (2011) definition of indirect 
and insider advocacy was used to organize data points.  
To ensure coding reliability and reduce ambiguities the codes and themes were 
discussed with field experts during and after the coding process. All interview data was cross-
checked against observational notes and data artefacts which also assisted to establish 
relationships between different parts of the data (Miles & Huberman, 1999). In this process 
we also compared whether the narratives and discourses by respondents differed based on 
geographical location. Although there were some differences (for example in Perm 
respondents made more references to incidents of indirect advocacy tactics however often 
describing the activities of other none human service organizations rather than their own), our 
aim was to establish an overarching narrative illustrating the challenges and issues Russian 
HEnonprofits faced in a constricted societal space rather than capturing organizational or 
regional variances. We present our analysis by drawing on the practices of reporting narrative 
enquiry outcomes where the aim is to highlight how respondents make sense of their own 
world (Bruner, 1991). Thus we present the narrative constituting the emergent themes using 
‘illuminating examples’ (de Vaus, 2001, p. 240) from the interviews to exemplify key points.  
Findings 
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Indirect Tactics  
Mosley (2011) suggests a variety of activities that can be characterized as indirect 
advocacy tactics. However, the activities Mosley (2011) describes require the mobilization of 
the public – a capability Russian nonprofits lack (Crotty, 2009). Despite this, HEnonprofits in 
this study did illustrate that they “[wrote] letters to the social protection department” 
(Respondent 50, Org02Yek) or are “writing a complaint” (Respondent 38, Org13Per) on 
behalf of their constituents. HEnonprofits also illustrated that they wrote letters for specific 
individuals who would approach them directly for assistance. This was not done as part of a 
planned advocacy campaign but instead part of the organizations case advocacy approach. If 
these letters were ineffective however, HEnonprofits appeared to capitulate stating that they 
“never go to court” (Respondent 48, Org23Per) or followed up failed complaints. Other 
indirect advocacy tactics were absent from the respondents’ narratives or their use was 
rejected. Respondent 32, captures the attitude towards demonstrations present in all the 
narratives captured by this study. 
 
The authorities turn away from them [organizations which engage in demonstrations] 
and mainly cooperate with us. Events such as going on to the street and shouting give 
us this, give us that, we do not do this. We do not want conflict with the authorities or 
the government (Respondent 32, Org08Per). 
 
Similarly, respondents stated that “I do not like working through demonstrations at 
all” (Respondent 48, Org23Per), or did “not do big actions and activities like that 
[demonstrations]” (Respondent 52, Org04Yek). Hence, in addition to the historic lack of 
organizational capability to mobilize the public and the public’s apathy to engage with 
nonprofits (Crotty, 2006), HEnonprofits viewed demonstrations or direct protest action 
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negatively. HEnonprofits perception of elite response (Tarrow, 1988) meant that participation 
in such events was viewed as resulting in antagonizing a state that had already constrained 
nonprofits’ social space. Thus HEnonprofits actively rejected the participation therein. 
Furthermore, demonstrations and other indirect advocacy tactics required 
organizations to collaborate with others in for example advocacy coalitions or umbrella 
organizations (Balassiano & Chandler, 2010). Although HEnonprofits did note that they co-
operated on for example “organizing a roundtable” (Respondent 47, Org22Per) this 
interaction was described as “helping us mainly morally” (Respondent 6, Org06Sam) or 
downplayed as unimportant “[it is] not really cooperation, it is more an exchange of ideas” 
(Respondent 50, Org02Yek). When the narrative on co-operation was explored further, 
HEnonprofits indicated that that “there is no love or friendship lost” (Respondent 27, 
Org03Per) between organizations. They also and portrayed other HEnonprofits as 
“competitors” (Respondent 6, Org06Sam; Respondent, 27, Org03Per; Respondent 49, 
Org01Yek) rather than partners for a common cause or a member of the same social 
movement. In pitting one group against another the foreign funding regimes of the 1990s 
(Henderson, 2002) have contributed to this resistance to collaborate. With competition now 
for state funding still in place, this is unlikely to change.  
The experience of Russian HEnonprofits suggests that they perceived the majority of 
indirect advocacy tactics available to nonprofits (see Mosley, 2011) as not relevant. The 
politicization of nonprofit advocacy activity by the state via regulation and targeted 
organizational inspections (Earle, 2013), has dis-incentivized HEnonprofits from using 
indirect advocacy tactics. Thus HEnonprofits also saw no need to involve or mobilize the 
public. This combined with the absence of advocacy coalitions deprived HEnonprofits of 
leverage vis-à-vis ruling and governing elites. It seems that the constricted social space in 
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which HEnonprofits exists limits the use of indirect advocacy tactics and requires them to 
utilize insider advocacy tactics.  
Insider Advocacy  
As illustrated above, insider tactics were not associated with specific activities, but 
were instead delineated by the ability of nonprofits to directly access ruling and governing 
elites (Mosley, 2011). For example, Mosley (2012) considers access based on personal 
relationships as providing a crucial platform for insider advocacy. HEnonprofits in this study 
illustrated several direct access opportunities to ruling and governing elites. HEnonprofits 
sought to “participate in all meetings, committees, roundtables, conferences that are organized 
by the government” (Respondent 29, Org05Per). Reflecting the importance of personal ties 
(Mishler & Rose, 1997), respondents also highlighted that they could use connections such as 
“university friends or friends I made around that time” (Respondent 79, Org30Yek) to gain 
access to these meetings. However, most pointed out that to participate in these meetings you 
needed to be “invited” (Respondent 61, Org12Yek). In addition, engagement in such events 
was often a one-off and did not allow HEnonprofits to develop an outlet for more systematic 
insider advocacy tactics. Thus HEnonprofits were aware of the need to “move away from one-
time events” (Respondent 64, Org15Yek) as part of developing regular access to ruling and 
governing elites. As a result a number of HEnonprofits (Org01Sam, Org07Sam, Org18Sam, 
Org02Per, Org05Per, Org11Per, Org12Per, Org02Yek, Org12, Yek, Org15Yek, Org30Yek), 
indicated that they had tried to get elected to the regional Civic Chamber. A place in the Civic 
Chamber would provide consistent access to the regional ruling and governing elites.  
HEnonprofits were aware that they participate in “manipulated structures” 
(Respondent 61, Org12Yek), and that these are not “initiatives [that] come from the ground 
up” (Respondent 33, Org09Per). Nevertheless, this access enabled HEnonprofits to become 
“friendly with the government and lets them know we exist” (Respondent 64, Org15Yek). 
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Thus insider advocacy was seen less as a way of influencing decision making by ruling and 
governing elites but an opportunity to promote “ideas” (Respondent 16, Org17Sam), “where 
you should speak your mind” (Respondent 64, Org15Yek) or “approach the authorities with a 
problem” (Respondent 48, Org23Per). However, HEnonprofits were also aware of elite 
response (Tarrow, 1989) and that the scope of topics that could be discussed within the Civic 
Chamber was limited because “you will not be re-invited if you raise something they do not 
like” (Respondent 50, Org02Yek).  
Thus, HEnonprofits in this study did not engage roundtables and committees for 
insider tactics. Instead they were seen as “a good way for the government to tell us about 
[upcoming] changes to the law” (Respondent 10, Org10Sam) or “try to know what the 
government wants to do or wants us to do” (Respondent 29, Org05Per). Insider tactics were 
not viewed as a way to shape the governing and ruling elites policy agendas. Hence, 
HEnonprofits viewed roundtables or other meetings, as an opportunity to establish working 
relationships with the state via “helping [to] build personal relations” (Respondent 50, 
Org02Yek). Even though this was a vital component of insider tactics (Mosley, 2011, 2012) 
HEnonprofits in this study did not portray such emerged relationships in this way. Instead 
these relationships were more useful for day-to-day activities as they facilitated “solving 
problems that we face when we want to do an event” (Respondent 79, Org30Yek). Thus, as 
respondent 60 outlines, HEnonprofits were motivated to engage in these roundtables or 
committees so that they “will be able to tell the relevant person without the Civic Chamber” 
(Respondent 60, Org11Yek), rather than using the direct access offered by the state as part of 
their advocacy tactics.  
Using Advocacy Tactics: Case Advocacy  
As illustrated above for HEnonprofits in this study, advocacy was also not about 
influencing policy but a way of accessing information for dissemination amongst their 
	 17 
constituencies (clients as well as members) or providing a service. In so doing, advocacy was 
viewed as “enlighten[ing] people about their rights” (Respondent 54, Org06Yek).  
Thus understanding of advocacy was markedly different from how advocacy is 
defined in the literature or understood in mature democracies (Boris & Mosher-Williams, 
1998) where such activities are aimed at promoting a common or aggregate interest (Andrews 
& Edwards, 2004) or organizational maintenance (Mosley, 2012). Moreover in our study, 
advocacy was done for individuals. Organizations in all three regions therefore saw advocacy 
not as a way of promoting change at a policy level but as “help[ing] individuals solve their 
problems” (Respondent 60, Org11Yek; Respondent 14, Org15Sam; Respondent 29, 
Org05Per; Respondent 32, Org08Per).  
The fact that advocacy was focused on the individual rather than shaping public 
discourse is no doubt an outcome of the constricted nature of HEnonprofits operating 
environment. It might also suggest that HEnonprofits lack the necessary organizational 
capacity to engage in influencing at the policy level. However, HEnonprofits in this study 
stated that advocacy at the policy level at the municipal or regional level bore little fruit 
because “it is very difficult to change the situation for the better on a regional level (…), 
because decision are made in Moscow” (Respondent 42, Org17Per). In addition, Respondent 
12 described the sentiments of others in highlighting that governing elites at the municipal 
and regional level lacked the willingness to engage with nonprofits and thus enable their 
participation in policy making.  
 
During the Soviet Union, HEnonprofits did not do any advocacy work and I think such 
stereotypes are still there [amongst the ruling and governing elites] (Respondent 12, 
Org12Sam). 
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This perceived lock out at the regional and municipal level explains why HEnonprofits 
in this study focused on advocacy for individuals to assert their social rights. In turn this 
meant that HEnonprofits only engage in advocacy type activities that would not get them into 
trouble with ruling and governing elites, and thus limited harmful elite response (Tarrow, 
1988). Consequently, advocacy activities for individuals had become part of the services 
provision HEnonprofits offer to their constituencies. The lack of narrative with regards to 
participation in more systematic ways to influence policy is however, worrisome as it means 
that interest representation within Russia’s ailing welfare sector remains underdeveloped 
(Cerami, 2009). This service based approach to advocacy allows low level individual 
grievances to be smoothed out, without presenting a challenge to the overall authority of 
ruling and governing elites. It also means that current nonprofit advocacy has limited scope to 
drive democratization.  
Conclusion 
In this paper we examine how Russian nonprofits advocate. In so doing we answer 
Almog-Bar and Schmid’s (2014) call to add nuance to the understanding of advocacy in 
different contexts. Little has been known about the availability, motivation and use of 
advocacy tactics in managed democracies and our paper sheds some light on these issues. 
Russia’s managed democratic context and cultural-historic heritage provide an insight into 
nonprofit advocacy tactics. 
In this paper we employed Mosley’s (2011) framework of indirect and insider 
advocacy tactics to structure respondents’ narrative on the nature and use advocacy activities. 
Our evidence indicates that this framework is simplistic in describing the complicated 
contextual factors affecting Russian nonprofits’ choice of advocacy activity. Thus the 
respondents’ discourse shows an awareness of a wide variety of indirect advocacy activities 
available. Although Mosley’s (2011) framework is useful in providing an initial description of 
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indirect advocacy, it does not account for the constrictedness of the context in which Russian 
HEnonprofits operate and the limited choice of actual advocacy activities available. These 
choices are limited because HEnonprofits fear antagonizing the state and a negative elite 
response or retaliation (Tarrow, 1988). Retaliation could be proactive such as unannounced 
organizational audits (Earle, 2013), blacklisting which restricts an nonprofit’s ability to access 
funding from domestic sources, or passive with ruling and governing elites ignoring 
organizations and subsequent loss of access. Hence, Russia’s managed democracy 
demonstrates that in a socially constricted context nonprofits face a more complex and 
nuanced consideration when making choices about advocacy and attempting to balance 
service-provision objectives and social justice goals (Sanders & McClellan, 2014; Tomlinson 
& Schwabenland, 2009). Therefore, in extending Mosley’s (2011) framework to the Russian 
case where societal space for nonprofits is constricted, we need to establish the subcategory of 
limited indirect advocacy tactics.  
Another key aspect of Mosley’s (2011) framework is the use of insider advocacy 
tactics. Given the importance of personal relationships in Russian society, nonprofits require 
such access in order to open up areas for action and democratization. In this context access to 
ruling and governing elites are controlled by the state. In effect the Russian state controls 
access to personal relationships, ensuring that most of the power remains rooted within ruling 
and governing elites.  
This has resulted in a pragmatic response by Russian HEnonprofits, who see 
institutionalized access points not primarily as opportunities to influence but opportunity to 
build or maintain personal relationships to facilitate organizational maintenance or case/client 
advocacy. In the Russian setting with constricted societal space for nonprofit activity, we 
have to refer to institutionalized insider advocacy tactics, thus adding a subcategory to 
Mosley’s (2012) insider tactics. Such institutionalized insider advocacy tactics also mean that 
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organizations are reluctant to cooperate with each other as access is limited and thus 
competitive. Our evidence suggest that organizations perceive that those nonprofits winning 
such access take a more pragmatic and less confrontational approach to ruling and governing 
elites which limits engagement in indirect advocacy activities.  
Mosley (2011) states that nonprofits engage in advocacy via both indirect and insider 
tactics and although this suggest that organizations might need to consider trade-off engaging 
in one and not the other, the assumption of this consideration is based on the potential 
effectiveness of the various tactics. This also assumes that consistent opportunity for 
advocacy exists and that organizations have the skills to engage in advocacy and advocacy 
choices are about tactical effectiveness. However the context of the Russian Federation 
highlights that organizational consideration about trade-offs focused less on tactical 
effectiveness and more on organizational survival. Although limited indirect advocacy tactics 
encouraged HEnonprofits to involve the wider Russian public and give vulnerable sections of 
society a voice, institutionalized advocacy tactics facilitate organizational survival and their 
ability to provide services to these groups. Our insights show that HEnonprofits felt that it 
was better to have some interaction with the state and its institutions even if it is controlled, 
licensed, and directed by ruling and governing elites, rather than no involvement at all. They 
trade off indirect advocacy tactics. Interaction means that the state was aware of HEnonprofits 
existence. This constitutes a positive development because in the past ruling and governing 
elites were altogether ignorant to the existence of nonprofits (Jakobson & Sanovich, 2010). In 
the longer run, human service nonprofits may be able to leverage this attention by influencing 
public policy and government behavior (Andrews & Edwards, 2004) and contribute to the 
democratization process or widen public participation in political processes (Meyer, 2004). 
The conclusions drawn here do need to be seen in light of the limitations of this study. 
A larger sample, different methodological approach, different sectors and regions may have 
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led to different reactions and narratives and are avenues for future research. Despite these 
limitations and the papers focus on only two specific types of organizations in three Russian 
regions, our findings show a strong relationship with the extended literature on civil society in 
Russia (Crotty, 2009; Jakobson & Sanovich, 2010; Spencer, 2011).  
Our results also suggest that the recently observed success of advocacy activities 
(Fröhlich, 2012; Javeline & Lindemann-Komarova, 2010) remain singular events and are not 
yet evidence of the development of an active advocacy culture among all types of Russian 
nonprofits. The narratives of respondents indicate that HEnonprofits both fear elite response 
as well as lack the relevant capacity or organizational culture, i.e., their understanding of 
advocacy as only a case based activity, to take full advantage of available, albeit 
institutionalized, advocacy opportunities. Hence nonprofit advocacy activities in this context 
remain constrained (Crotty & Hall, 2013). Our evidence suggests that in a constricted civil 
society space advocacy tactics need to be classified as limited indirect and institutionalized 
insider – rather than just indirect and insider. It highlights that Russian nonprofits are 
pragmatic creatures who have adapted their available advocacy tactics to their context.  
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Appendices  
Appendix A: 
Organization Date, 
Membership/
Staff  
Main Objective 
Org01Sam 1991, 8 S Civil Society Development 
Org02Sam 2001, 1 S Promoting educational techniques 
Org03Sam 2007, 6 S Charitable programs 
Org04Sam 2000, 2 S Educating volunteers 
Org05Sam 1992 (1918), 
ca. 3000 M 
Youth programs 
Org06Sam 1991, 2 S Deaf education 
Org07Sam 2003, ca. 20 M Disability support 
Org08Sam 2000, 3 S Folklore education  
Org09Sam 1997 (1993), 3 
S  
Legal education 
Org10Sam 2001, 60 S Drug addiction and HIV/AIDS support 
Org11Sam 2002, 3 S Language education 
Org12Sam 2003, 100 M Assisting families of Down Syndrome 
children 
Org13Sam 1998, ca. 15 M Healthy lifestyle promotion 
Org14Sam (1924-1933) 
1987, 5 S 
Humanitarian aid for children 
Org15Sam 1999, 7 S HIV/AIDS support 
Org16Sam 2005 (1988), 2 Disability support 
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S 
Org17Sam 1998, 23 S Disability rights 
Org18Sam 1985, 5 S Healthy lifestyle promotion 
Org19Sam 2005, ca 4 S Organizing Youth exchanges and 
volunteers 
Org20Sam 2007, 3 S HIV/AIDS support 
Org21Sam 1992, 3 S Children’s rights 
Org22Sam 1999, 3 S HIV/AIDS education 
Org23Sam 1998, 1 S/ca 
10 M 
Child health promotion 
Org24Sam 2000, ca. 60 M Assisting the families of autistic 
children  
Org01Per 1999, 3 M Drug rehabilitation and education 
Org02Per 1868, 12 S Health services 
Org03Per 1999, ca 20 S Disability employment 
Org04Per 1995, 6 S Promoting and organizing Paralympic 
sport 
Org05Per 1938, 38 S Advocacy for the blind 
Org06Per 2006, N.A. Youth education 
Org07Per 1993, 4 S Disability rights 
Org08Per 1926, 22 S Advocacy for the deaf 
Org09Per 1997, N.A. Disability rehabilitation  
Org10Per 1998, 4 S Promoting children’s rights 
Org11Per 1992, ca 18 S Running museum and human rights 
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education 
Org12Per 1998, 4 S Human rights education 
Org13Per 2000, 60 M Disability rights 
Org14Per ca 1997, 70 M Assisting the families of autistic 
children 
Org15Per 1994, 50 M Hospice 
Org16Per 2005, 10 M Election monitoring and democracy 
education 
Org17Per 2006, 4 S Drug rehabilitation 
Org18Per 1996, 16 S Assisting TSOs with marketing and 
legal advice 
Org19Per 2005, 9 M Housing rights education 
Org20Per 2003, 20 M Citizenship education 
Org21Per 1994, 11 S Health rights education  
Org22Per 1998, 3 S Supporting and implementing social 
projects  
Org01Yek 1988, ca 15 S Disability rights 
Org02Yek 2003, 5 S Supporting new mothers 
Org03Yek ca 2005, 1 S Disability rights 
Org04Yek 1999, 1 S Disability rights 
Org05Yek ca 2000, 5 S Respite care for the families of disabled 
children 
Org06Yek 2001, 10 S/M Healthy lifestyle promotion  
Org07Yek 2001, ca 5 M Disability rights 
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Org08Yek 2002, ca 30 M Disability rights 
Org09Yek ca 2000, 20 S Drug rehabilitation 
Org10Yek 1996, 0 Disability rights - dissolved 
Org11Yek 2000, 7/8 S Children’s rights 
Org12Yek 1918, 10 S ca 
7000 M 
Advocacy for the Blind 
Org13Yek 1998, 1 S Aid to children in poverty 
Org14Yek 2004, 1 S After school education  
Org15Yek 2003, 20 M Disability rights 
Org16Yek 1999, 22 S Providing support to families of those 
with HIV/AIDS 
Org17Yek 1995, 2 S Organizing special Olympics 
Org18Yek 2002, 9 M Learning disability rights 
Org19Yek 2007, 6 M Education for peace 
Org20Yek 1992, 32 M Support for children’s homes 
Org21Yek 1999, ca 30 M Respite for the families of children with 
cancer - dissolved 
Org22Yek  1992, 8 S Disability rehabilitation  
Org23Yek 1996, 2 M Assisting for children with disabilities 
Org24Yek 1998, 3 S Education of deaf children 
Org25Yek 1999, ca. 10 S Student’s rights education 
Org26Yek 1992 (1918), 
ca. 17 000 M/ 
ca 25 S 
Youth education activities 
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Org27Yek 1988, 5 S Disability rights 
Org28Yek 1961, 4 S After school clubs 
Org29Yek 1998, ca. 40 S Drug rehabilitation 
Org30Yek 2003, ca. 450 
M 
Support MS sufferers 
Org31Yek 2004, ca. 3 S Migrant rights education 
Org32Yek 2005, ca. 20 S Disability rights education 
Org33Yek 2000, 1 S Addiction education 
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